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The moment a mere numerical superiority by either states or voters 
in this country proceeds to ignore the needs and desires of the 
minority, and for their own selfish purpose or advancement, hamper 
or oppress that minority, or debar them in any way from equal 
privileges and equal rights—that moment will mark the failure of 
our constitutional system. 
  Franklin D. Roosevelt1 
t the dawn of the twentieth century, populists and progressives 
forged a movement to reform American democracy.  Fed up 
with state governments corrupted by decades of control by big 
business and big money, this movement sought to return sovereignty 
to the people and make government, and the process of government, 
more responsive to the needs of average citizens.  Populists and 
progressives helped pass legislation, state and federal, protecting the 
interests of laborers, farmers, and average citizens against corporate 
dominance in both the economic and political sectors.2  This 
 
*  Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.  Some passages in this Article 
discussing Pierce v. Society of Sisters are drawn from PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES 
(forthcoming 2009).  I wish to thank the members of the Oregon Law Review and the other 
participants in this symposium.  I also want to thank Leslie Baze and Brienne Carpenter 
for their outstanding assistance. 
1 Radio broadcast, Mar. 2, 1930, in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 555 
(Robert Andrews ed., 1993). 
2 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XVI, XVII (limiting Congress’s ability to levy taxes 
and providing for the popular election of U.S. Senators, respectively); Clayton Antitrust 
Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 52–53 (2008)) (strengthening the Sherman Antitrust Act and exempting unions from 
antitrust legislation); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (1966) (establishing powers of initiative and 
A 
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movement also sought to bring government closer to the people, 
urging voters to amend their state constitutions so that they could 
govern directly through initiative or referendum.  In 1898, South 
Dakota became the first state to add direct democracy to its 
constitution; Utah followed in 1900.  Oregon was the third state to 
adopt direct legislation but it was the first state to engage in direct 
lawmaking.  Oregon quickly became the prototype for the direct 
democracy movement: the “Oregon System” was adopted around the 
country.  Today, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
include some form of direct democracy in their state constitutions.3 
Direct democracy was, and remains, highly controversial.  
Criticisms of direct democracy are both normative and practical.  
Most derive from the distinction between direct legislation and the 
system of representation embodied in the U.S. Constitution and state 
constitutions.  Direct legislation eliminates the deliberative process of 
legislative and executive review, circumventing the checks and 
balances that define representative democracy.  As a result, direct 
democracy has been severely criticized for violating the Republican 
Form of Government Clause of the U.S. Constitution, eliminating 
political accountability, and failing to safeguard the rights of 
minorities.4  The initiative process in states like Oregon comes under 
 
referendum in California); CAL. PENAL CODE § 393 1/2 (West 1914) (prohibiting 
employers from requiring more than an eight-hour work day); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 
(1908) (recall on public officials); 1908 Or. Laws c. 3 (limiting campaign expenditures); 
1910 Or. Laws c. 5 (providing mechanisms for direct primary nomination). 
3 Initiative and Referendum Institute, State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum 
Provisions, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).  
Direct democracy comprises a variety of different methods for vesting lawmaking directly 
with citizens, including popular initiative, referendum, and recall.  Numerous variations on 
these methods exist at both the state and local level.  For purposes of this Article, direct 
democracy and direct legislation refer to those forms of lawmaking that bypass legislative 
and executive decision making and rest ultimate authority with the voters. 
4 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 293, 295 (2007); K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using 
Alternate Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1208 
(1995); Edward J. Erler & Brian P. Janiskee, California’s Three Strikes Law: Symbol and 
Substance, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 176 (2002); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1539 (1990); Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public 
Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 
TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1995); Justin Henderson, The Tyranny of the Minority: Is it 
Time to Jettison Ballot Initiatives in Arizona?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963, 964 (2007); David B. 
Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 20 (1995); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the 
Republic for Which it Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1061 (1996). 
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particular fire because it allows amendment of the state constitution 
by a simple majority vote.5 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, in designing a representative 
system of government, weighed the virtues of a republic against those 
of a plebiscite and rejected direct democracy.  James Madison wrote 
extensively on the dangers of direct democracy, warning of the dual 
threats of a tyranny of the majority and the capture of government by 
a minority faction.6  One hundred years later, when populists and 
progressives campaigned to bring direct democracy to state 
government, opponents sounded similar alarms, arguing that direct 
legislation would lead to mob rule.  More recently, critics charge that 
a system designed to decrease the leverage of big business and big 
money over government has become a powerful tool for well-
financed special interests.7 
Even if one assumes that majoritarian democracy is the ideal, direct 
legislation typically is a highly flawed means of reflecting majority 
 
5 OR. CONST. art. XVII; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (amended 2006) (requiring 
that any proposed amendment or revision to the state constitution, whether proposed by 
the legislature, by initiative, or by any other method, must be approved by at least sixty 
percent of the voters rather than by a simple majority); Steve C. Briggs, Colorado Bar 
Association President’s Message to Members—The Shadow Side of the Right to Vote: The 
Ballot Initiative, 33 COLO. LAW. 47 (Nov. 2004); Catherine Engberg, Taking the 
Initiative: May Congress Reform State Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican 
Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2001); Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining 
Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037 
(2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself 
of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the 
Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1995). 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 61–62 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“[A] 
pure [d]emocracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, 
who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the 
mischiefs [sic] of faction. . . . [S]uch [d]emocracies have ever been spectacles of 
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or 
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been 
violent in their deaths.”); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), 
in 24 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 500, 505–06 (Paul H. Smith 
ed., Library of Congress 1996) (“Those who contend for a simple Democracy . . . assume 
or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious.  They found their reasoning on the idea, 
that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but 
that they have all precisely the same interests . . . .  [N]o Society ever did or can consist of 
so homogenous a mass of Citizens.”); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson 
(Oct. 17, 1788), in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 253, 254 (Saul K. 
Padover ed., 1953) (stating that danger of oppression lies in acts where “Government is the 
mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents”). 
7 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 4, at 1557–58; Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: 
Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1203–10 (2005). 
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will.  Poorly worded initiatives can leave voters confused about the 
consequences of their vote.  Citizens may ignore bloated voter 
pamphlets and cast their vote with little or no substantive 
understanding of the issues.  Without the deliberative process, 
unintended policy consequences occur.  For example, Oregon 
commercial fishing was halted when Oregon voters in 1908 
simultaneously passed two competing initiatives banning or limiting 
fishing methods in the Columbia River.8  Unintended budgetary 
impacts pose some of the most significant consequences of 
circumventing the deliberation process.  Implementation of initiatives 
may require substantial state expenditures, often to the detriment of 
other policies and programs. 
One can readily conclude that lawmaking by initiative, the 
manifestation of unchecked majority will, carries a high risk of 
producing bad laws.  The “bad law” risk posed by the initiative is not 
simply that of generic poor policy.  The absence of the deliberative 
process can leave the voters with profoundly inaccurate information.  
False information may be an unintended byproduct of the public 
campaign, or it may be deliberately disseminated for political 
advantage.  Deliberate dissemination of false information can be a 
particularly potent and harmful strategy to agitate the majority against 
minority groups.  Immune from legislative or executive review, 
initiative campaigns may rely on appeals to voter prejudice.  The only 
checks on bias-driven initiatives are a well-financed opposition and 
judicial review. 
Direct democracy in Oregon has produced an abundant number of 
controversial proposals.  Since 1902, Oregonians have debated more 
than 340 initiative measures, including proposals concerning recall of 
public officials, popular election of U.S. Senators, women’s suffrage, 
tax relief, supermajority voting requirements, the death penalty, 
mandatory minimum sentences, gay rights, and death with dignity.9  
In 1922, Oregon voters approved one of the most controversial 
initiatives in Oregon history, the compulsory public education 
measure, dubbed the “School Bill” by the press.10  The compulsory 
 
8 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND 
RECALL: 1908–1910 (2008), available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ 
elections11.htm. 
9 See, e.g., infra note 100–01. 
10 See, e.g., School Bill Makes Trouble for Democrats, OREGONIAN, Nov. 1, 1922, at 1; 
School Bill Again Rapped, OR. STATESMAN, Nov. 1, 1922, at 2; Debate on School Bill, 
OR. VOTER, Oct. 7, 1922, at 14. 
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public education law, the first enacted in the country, required 
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school, 
effectively destroying private, particularly Catholic, education in the 
state.  The challenge to Oregon’s compulsory public education law 
yielded a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters.11  In Pierce, the Court struck down the Oregon law, finding 
that it violated the constitutional rights of parents to control the 
upbringing and education of their children. 
The fight over compulsory public education revealed more than a 
landmark constitutional dispute.  The story of the School Bill 
campaign offers insights into systemic problems with the initiative 
process.  The campaign was widely condemned throughout the 
country for exploiting voter ignorance and prejudice.12  The initiative 
inflamed passions on both sides, with political observers describing 
the measure as the most controversial in the state since the question of 
slavery.  The proponents, led by the Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish 
Rite Masons, waged a campaign that exploited voters’ antipathies 
toward Catholics, radicals, and immigrants.13  Proponents also misled 
the public as to the effect of the law.  The success of these tactics 
serves, even today, as a confirmation that direct legislation offers a 
powerful vehicle for enacting prejudice against unpopular minorities. 
During this commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Oregon 
statehood, it is fitting to tell a story of how the constitution has 
affected the lives of Oregonians.  Through the initiative and 
referendum process, average citizens wield substantial, and direct, 
authority over state governance.  As we assess the state constitutional 
landscape, it is fair to conclude that direct legislation has dramatically 
influenced Oregon law and history.  The last thirty years have seen a 
notable increase in the use of initiatives to resolve controversial social 
issues.  As we pause to reflect on Oregon’s rich constitutional history, 
 
11 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
12 See, e.g., Eyes of Nation Watching Forces of Intolerance in Struggle to Seize Oregon, 
PORTLAND TELEGRAM, Oct. 26, 1922; RECORDER (San Francisco) (date unknown) (“Such 
laws as the recently adopted Oregon School Law are a reflection upon the intelligence of 
the people who adopted them, and . . . should be cast into the discard with other evidence 
of bigotry and intolerance), as cited in NAT’L CATHOLIC WELFARE COUNCIL, PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW 8–9 (1923); NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 
18, 1922 (“When we seek for the motives of the Oregon law we encounter the familiar 
bogey of little minds . . . . A plague on all this intolerance masquerading as 
Americanism.”), as cited in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW, supra, at 9. 
13 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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it is wise to consider whether it is time to take a fresh look at judicial 
review of direct legislation. 
This Article presents a case study of the initiative process by 
examining the campaigns waged for and against the School Bill.  It is 
not intended to provide a thorough study of deception and 
discrimination in the initiative process.  Instead, this Article offers 
case-specific insight into how voters can be manipulated by 
misinformation and prejudice.  Part I examines the tension between 
representative democracy and the initiative process, particularly how 
the initiative undermines the deliberative process.  Part II explores the 
history of the Oregon initiative prior to the School Bill.  Part III 
describes how the Oregon initiative campaign for compulsory public 
education used misinformation to confuse voters and encourage 
bigotry.  Part IV analyzes how voter ignorance, fear, and prejudice 
toward minority groups may taint the initiative process.  Part V 
explores legal solutions and recommends that the courts reject the 
presumption of constitutionality attached to facially neutral legislation 
or legislation targeting nonsuspect classes and closely scrutinize 
direct legislation that harms historically disadvantaged groups. 
I 
THE MAJORITARIAN DILEMMA 
Ben Franklin, when questioned at the close of the Constitutional 
Convention as to the type of government created, was famously 
reputed to respond, “A republic, if you can keep it.”14  The Framers 
embodied a republic in the structure of the U.S. Constitution by 
limiting the unchecked power of majorities.  Separation of federal 
powers, division of power between federal and state governments, the 
electoral college, and embedded checks and balances are the most 
obvious examples that the Framers established a representative form 
of government to prevent tyranny by diffusing power.  It is no 
accident that the people exercise no direct lawmaking authority under 
the U.S. Constitution; the tyranny that concerned the Framers was as 
much that of majority or “mob” rule as it was of a monarch.15  
 
14 As delegates emerged from the Constitutional Convention, the following exchange 
purportedly took place: “Above the din, a Mrs. Powel, wife of the mayor of Philadelphia, 
shouted out, ‘Well Dr. Franklin, what have we got, a monarchy or a republic?’ Franklin 
looked at her over his spectacles and responded, ‘A Republic, madam, IF you can keep it.’  
EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 11 (1972). 
15 Alexander Hamilton, Convention of New York: Speech on the Compromises of the 
Constitution (1788), in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 426, 440 (John C. 
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Sovereignty may lie with the people, but only as a source of power, 
not as lawmaker.  Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, 
providing for election of senators by state legislatures, and Article V, 
assigning the amendment process to Congress and state legislatures or 
conventions, are powerful indicators of the Framers’ commitment to 
limiting direct government.16 
Not surprisingly, The Federalist Papers laud the virtues of 
representative democracy.17  Madison argued that a republic offers 
the best way to control the “dangerous vice” of faction.18  The harm 
of faction derives from unchecked popular will: 
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting 
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.19 
 
Hamilton ed., 1850) (“The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves 
deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. [] Their very character was 
tyranny; their figure deformity.  When they assembled, the field of debate presented an 
ungovernable mob . . . . [I]t became a matter of contingency, whether the people subjected 
themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant, or by another.”). 
16 The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, replaced the process in Article I, 
Section 3 with the election of senators directly by the people. 
17 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62, 64, 65 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 
1995) (“A [r]epublic, by which I mean a [g]overnment in which the scheme of 
representation takes place . . . promises the cure for which we are seeking. . . . [T]he 
greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the 
compass of [r]epublican, than of [d]emocratic [g]overnment . . . renders factious 
combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. . . . [T]he same advantage, 
which a [r]epublic has over a [d]emocracy, in controlling the effects of faction, . . . is 
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it.  Does this advantage consist in the 
substitution of [r]epresentatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render 
them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice?  It will not be denied, that 
the Representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.  
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the 
event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?  In an equal degree 
does the [i]ncreased variety of parties, comprised within the Union, [i]ncrease this 
security.  Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and 
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?  Here, again, the 
extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 
194 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (asserting that the republican form of 
government contemplated by the Guaranty Clause was predicated upon “the total 
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity”) (emphasis in original); see also John 
Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86–93 (Robert J. Taylor 
ed.) (Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (“[T]here is no good government but what is 
Republican.”). 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995). 
19 Id. at 57. 
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Madison made clear the value of a republic over pure democracy: 
[A] pure [d]emocracy, by which I mean, a [s]ociety, consisting of a 
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
[g]overnment in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs [sic] 
of faction.  A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, 
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert 
results from the form of [g]overnment itself; and there is nothing to 
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an 
obnoxious individual. . . . 
A [r]epublic, by which I mean a [g]overnment in which the scheme 
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and 
promises the cure for which we are seeking.20 
Federalist 51 emphasizes the significance of republicanism to 
protecting minority political groups: 
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society 
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the 
society against the injustice of the other part.  Different interests 
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens.  If a majority be 
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be 
insecure.21 
Other writings by Federalists strike similar themes.  Alexander 
Hamilton disdained the purported virtues of pure democracy: 
 It has been observed, that a pure democracy, if it were 
practicable, would be the most perfect government.  Experience has 
proved, that no position in politics is more false than this.  The 
ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, 
never possessed one feature of good government. [] Their very 
character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they 
assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob         
. . . .22 
Charles Pinckney expressed similar misgivings about unfettered 
democracy: 
It is the anarchy, if I may use the term, or rather worse than 
anarchy, of a pure democracy which I fear—where the laws lose 
their respect, and the magistrates their authority; where no 
permanent security is given to the property and privileges of the 
citizens; and no measures pursued, but such as suit the temporary 
interest and convenience of the prevailing parties, I cannot figure to 
myself a government more truly degrading; and yet such has been 
 
20 Id. at 61–62 (emphases added). 
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 169–70 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995). 
22 Hamilton, supra note 15, at 440. 
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the fate of all the ancient, and will, without great care, be probably 
the fate of all the modern republics.23 
Edward Rutledge wrote to John Jay about the need to mediate 
populist government through separation of powers: 
A pure Democracy may possibly do when patriotism is the ruling 
Passion, but when a State abounds in Rascals (as is the case with 
too many at this day) you must suppress a little of that Popular 
Spirit, vest the executive powers of Government in an individual 
that they may have Vigor, & let them be as ample . . . .24 
And John Adams concluded that the “simplicity of . . . a pure 
democracy will always have its charm with minds not kept awake to 
its susceptibility of abuse.”25 
Even the anti-Federalists, far more supportive of pure democracy, 
recognized the substantial difficulties faced by a federal government 
designed as a national plebiscite.  Some, like George Mason, argued 
the virtues of pure democracy outweighed the risks: “I am for 
preserving inviolably the democratic branch of the government.  True, 
we have found inconveniences from pure democracies; but if we 
mean to preserve peace and real freedom, they must necessarily 
become a component part of a national government.”26  The “Brutus” 
essays admit that pure democracy functions only in political 
communities small enough to make citizen participation practical and 
meaningful: 
In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is 
declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come 
together to deliberate, and decide.  This kind of government cannot 
be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it 
must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds 
as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, 
understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion 
concerning it.27 
 
23 Charles Pinckney, Speech to the New Jersey Assembly (Mar. 13, 1786), in 23 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 187, 192 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1976). 
24 Letter from Edward Rutledge to John Jay (Nov. 24, 1776), in 5 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 538 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1979). 
25 John Adams, Illness in Europe—Commercial Treaties—Mission to the Court of 
Great Britain, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 400, 428 (1856). 
26 George Mason, The Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 383, 433 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937). 
27 “BRUTUS” NO. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), The Anti-Federalist Papers, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus01.htm. 
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Of course, the design of the federal government leaves unresolved 
the legitimacy or value of pure democracy at the state level.  The 
Framers rejected a government based on national plebiscite.  They did 
not contemplate the variations on pure democracy presented by the 
initiative and referendum.  The Constitution does, however, address 
the importance of representative government at the state level.  
Article IV, Section 4 mandates that “the United States shall guarantee 
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”  The 
debates at the Constitutional Convention on the Guarantee Clause 
reflect a concern that individual states might institute a monarchy or 
aristocracy.28  But many of the Framers were equally concerned about 
the tyranny of the majority.29  The Constitution requires states, as 
well as the federal government, to establish a republic because the 
Framers concluded that a representative democracy was superior to 
any other form of government, be it monarchy or pure democracy.  
The Guarantee Clause does not, however, define “a republican form 
of government.”  Thus, the clause offers little guidance for 
determining whether direct legislation satisfies the republicanism 
requirement; a number of commentators have argued it does not.30  
 
28 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 280 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) (statement of 
William Grayson) (“What, sir, is the present Constitution?  A republican government 
founded on the principles of monarchy . . . There is an executive fetter in some parts, and 
as unlimited in others as a Roman dictator.  A democratic branch marked with the strong 
features of aristocracy, and an aristocratic branch with all the impurities and imperfections 
of the British House of Commons . . .”); see also id. at 417 (statement of Francis Corbin) 
(“Animadverting on Mr. Henry’s observations, that the French had been the instruments of 
their own slavery, that the Germans had enslaved the Germans, and the Spaniards the 
Spaniards, &c., he asked if those nations knew any thing [sic] of representation.”); 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(statement of Edmund Randolph) (“[A] republican government must be the basis of our 
national union; and no state in it ought to have it in their power to change its government 
into a monarchy.”). 
29 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 15; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 169 (James 
Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“It is of great importance in a republic, not only to 
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society 
against the injustice of the other part.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 124–25 (James 
Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government 
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is 
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or 
during good behaviour.  It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the 
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; 
otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of 
their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans . . . .”). 
30 See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 301–04; see also Steven William Marlowe, Direct 
Democracy Is Not Republican Government, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1035, 1046–48 
(2001); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The 
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The Supreme Court has held the Guarantee Clause to be 
nonjusticiable.31 
The robust republicanism of the original text of the U.S. 
Constitution has, however, been tempered by numerous amendments 
that enhance voter power and expand access to the franchise.  The 
amendments providing for direct election of senators, elimination of 
the poll tax, and prohibitions on discrimination based on race, gender, 
and age can be seen as a process of “democratizing” the 
Constitution.32  Direct legislation, in the form of the initiative and 
referendum reflects a similar decision to infuse state representative 
government with a strong dose of pure democracy.  The U.S. 
Constitution offers no clear answer on whether direct legislation’s 
alteration of representative government fatally undermines 
republicanism. 
If the U.S. Constitution leaves unresolved the validity of direct 
legislation, it does offer some compelling arguments for concern.  The 
initiative, designed to bypass the carefully wrought deliberative 
process of legislative and executive review, removes powerful 
systemic checks on prejudice in lawmaking.  To begin with, the 
initiative process circumvents the legislative drafting process.  It 
replaces professional analysis of legal conflicts and unintended 
consequences with partisan citizen drafters who may decide that 
confusion, rather than clarity, better serves their interests.  More 
significantly, lawmaking by initiative eliminates the benefits of 
deliberation gained through legislative debate and compromise.  
Direct legislation also removes the check of executive review through 
signature or veto.  Finally, unlike elected officials, voters have no 
duty to support the U.S. and state constitutions and remain 
unaccountable for acting on prejudice rather than reasoned judgment.  
These departures from representative government are substantial and 
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significant.  In particular, the omission of the checks and balances 
embodied in the deliberative process seriously undermines the 
protection of minority group interests, a value at the core of our 
constitutional system. 
In Oregon, the success of the 1922 initiative requiring all children 
to attend public schools offers a compelling example of how the 
initiative may be used as a tool of prejudice against minority political 
groups.  The Oregon campaign in favor of compulsory public 
education revealed the dark side of the initiative process.  Populists 
and progressives believed direct democracy would expand the rights 
and interests of citizens by returning lawmaking to the people.  With 
the School Bill, the people of Oregon faced the decision whether to 
use the initiative to reduce, rather than expand, the rights of her 
citizens.  The choice they made was driven by fear and bigotry.33  It 
would not have been made without the initiative. 
II 
THE STORY OF THE OREGON SYSTEM 
The populist and progressive drive to give average citizens greater 
control over lawmaking garnered enthusiastic support in many states, 
but perhaps nowhere more so than in Oregon, which enacted a direct 
democracy system that became a model for other states.  The direct 
democracy movement generated a great deal of controversy within 
the state, but when Oregonians finally approved direct legislation they 
wielded the initiative and referendum with zeal.  Since 1902, the 
initiative process has been a powerful tool for transforming Oregon 
social policy. 
A.  Populists and Progressive Roots 
The Oregon direct democracy movement began in the late 
nineteenth century, when a poor economy and unsafe working 
conditions in mines and timber attracted many Oregonians to 
populism.  They flocked to the People’s Party and placed populist 
politicians in the statehouse.  In 1887, Oregon became the first state to 
recognize the first Monday in September as Labor Day.34  Populists 
achieved only limited legislative success however; the legislature also 
 
33 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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housed incompetence and corruption, the “briefless lawyers, farmless 
farmers, business failures, bar-room loafers, Fourth-of-July orators, 
[and] political thugs”35 who served as the “representatives of the 
monied and monopolistic classes.”36 It was the corporate officers, 
bankers, and railroad magnates—the “First Families of Portland”—
who controlled the legislature. 
Rampant corruption in the management of federal land grants and 
the political power of corporate special interests pushed Oregonians 
to a radical response.  During the 1890s, an alliance of labor and farm 
interests joined to form the Joint Committee on Direct Legislation, a 
populist organization committed to bringing direct democracy to 
Oregon.37  Their literature promised that direct democracy, through 
the referendum and initiative process, would “make it impossible for 
corporations and boodlers to obtain unjust measures by which to 
profit at the expense of the people.”38  The Joint Committee, and its 
successor, the Direct Legislation League, joined with the populist 
People’s Party in an aggressive campaign to lobby support for a 
constitutional amendment establishing an initiative and referendum 
system.  The secretary of each of these groups, William S. U’Ren, a 
populist, attorney, and political activist, became the primary architect 
of direct democracy in Oregon, and a prominent figure in the national 
direct legislation movement where he became known as the “father” 
of the Oregon System.39 
U’Ren and the Populists faced an uphill battle in a Republican 
dominated state.  Editorials in the Oregonian called the proposal “one 
of the craziest of all the crazy fads of populism,”40 a “vagary which 
nobody cares about.”41  Undeterred, U’Ren sought a larger political 
forum to build support for the initiative and referendum amendment.  
Elected to the Oregon House of Representatives in 1897 as a Populist, 
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U’Ren orchestrated the infamous “Hold-up Session” of the 1897 
legislature, exploiting infighting between factions of Republicans to 
prevent formation of a quorum in the House.42  After two months, the 
legislature went home without convening, but U’Ren came away with 
promises of support for the direct legislation amendment from a 
number of powerful Republicans.  U’Ren called in those Republican 
pledges to gain legislative approval of the proposal during the 1899 
and 1901 legislative sessions.  By the time the amendment went to the 
voters in 1902, direct legislation enjoyed the support of all the 
political parties in Oregon, except the Prohibitionists.  The 
amendment passed in a landslide, 62,024 to 5668, amending the state 
constitution for the first time since 1859.43 
Direct democracy, dismissed only a few years earlier as a 
“socialistic innovation,”44 became the rallying cry of a citizenry fed 
up with public and corporate corruption.  Prominent Oregon politician 
George Williams accurately captured the public’s mood when he 
concluded that “in these days, when corporations and combinations of 
corporations have become so powerful, it seems to us that this 
amendment is necessary to protect the people from the aggressions of 
the money power of the country.”45  The “Oregon System,” as the 
reforms became known around the country, provided the majority 
with a potent antidote to the special interests controlling the 
statehouse. 
B.  Opposition 
The vision of egalitarian, participatory democracy promised by 
direct legislation did not appeal to all Oregonians.  Business interests 
and conservatives feared an empowered, radical majority, enamored 
of populist platforms and fomenting political chaos.  Philosophical 
opposition came from those who considered direct democracy at odds 
with the representative form of government established in the U.S. 
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Constitution.  Some populists and progressives viewed direct 
democracy as simply another means for the wealthy and powerful to 
deceive the average citizen into passing laws against their interests: 
 How would you like to live in a state where the people can and 
do amend their constitution in the most radical fashion by a 
minority vote, where one-third of the voters decides the fate of laws 
affecting the other two-thirds, . . . where special interests hire 
citizens to circulate petitions asking for the recall of judges who 
have found them guilty; where men representing themselves as for 
the people, buy signatures with drinks, forge dead men’s names, 
practice blackmail by buying and selling, for so much per name, 
signatures for petitions needed to refer certain measures to the 
people; a state where the demagogue thrives and the energetic crank 
with money through the Initiative and the Referendum, can legislate 
to his heart’s content . . . ?46 
One prominent Oregonian, Ralph Duniway, son of suffragist 
Abigail Scott Duniway, went further, stating: “[I]f the initiative and 
referendum is in force, I predict that men will be shot in the streets of 
Portland, that a state of anarchy will exist in Oregon, and that it will 
be necessary to call out the Federal troops.”47 
The Oregon System survived legal challenges at both the state and 
federal level.  In Kadderly v. City of Portland, the Oregon Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that the amendment violated Article IV, 
Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees to each state “[a] 
republican form of government.”48  The court found that in the direct 
democracy system “[t]he representative character of the government 
still remains.  The people have simply reserved to themselves a larger 
share of legislative power, but they have not overthrown the 
republican form of the government, or substituted another in its 
place.”49 
When the Article IV Guarantee Clause challenge to the Oregon 
initiative came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction.  In Pacific States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the Court held that the constitutional 
authority to determine whether a state has a republican form of 
government resides with Congress, not the courts.  Thus, the Court 
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reasoned that the constitutional challenge to direct legislation 
presented a political question outside the jurisdiction of the Court.50  
Pacific States sounded the death knell for challenges to direct 
legislation through the Guarantee Clause. 
C.  Direct Democracy During the Progressive Era 
The strength of public support for the Oregon System, and the 
vigor with which U’Ren and his People’s Power League employed 
the initiative and referendum, produced a veritable revolution in state 
government within a few short years.  In 1904, Oregonians, by 
initiative, approved a direct primary law that included, well before the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, a provision for the direct 
election of U.S. Senators.  In rapid succession the citizens adopted an 
array of progressive legislation including protective labor laws, recall 
power on public officials, a corrupt practices act, authorization for a 
state university, taxes on oil, railroad, utility, and communication 
companies, and extension of the initiative and referendum process to 
local government.51  By 1914, Oregonians added women’s suffrage, 
abolition of the poll tax and the death penalty, proportional 
representation, and the requirement of indictment by grand jury to the 
list of reforms achieved through the initiative process.  Although 
nearly half of the states eventually adopted some form of the Oregon 
System, during the first decade of the twentieth century Oregon stood 
alone in aggressively employing it, putting twenty-three initiatives on 
the ballot. 
The Oregon initiative, as used in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, served the progressive era well.  Direct legislation 
increased citizen involvement in the political process and reduced the 
influence of special interests.  Many of the reforms, including 
women’s suffrage, recall power, and workers’ compensation, 
expanded the rights and political participation of less powerful 
groups.52  U’Ren also achieved success in assuaging conservative 
business interests that the system provided “ample insurance against 
any revolutionary laws.”53  During these early years of direct 
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legislation, Senator Jonathan Bourne described the Oregon system as 
“the best system of popular government in the world today” and “the 
safest and most conservative plan of government ever invented.”54 
But Oregonians’ attachment to direct legislation carried a clear risk 
of abuse.  Allen Eaton, scholar and Oregon legislator, wrote in his 
1912 book The Oregon System: “From what has been said, it already 
must appear that the people of the state of Oregon enjoy a very wide 
political power—so wide that they may do anything in politics that 
they please to do.”55 
The direct democracy experiment drew national attention to 
Oregon.  U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice and former President, 
William Taft, reflected popular opinion when, visiting the Northwest, 
he described Oregon as a useful “laboratory” for dangerous political 
and social experiments, too remote from the centers of population in 
the Union to pose a serious hazard to the rest of the country.56 
Taft’s view of Oregon as a venue for political experimentation 
proved accurate.  In 1922, when proponents of the School Bill 
initiative obtained sufficient signatures to place the measure on the 
ballot, Oregonians faced a “dangerous” decision on whether to use the 
power of the initiative to reduce the rights of the Catholic and 
Lutheran minorities who maintained private schools. 
III 
THE STORY OF THE SCHOOL BILL INITIATIVE 
The School Bill was sponsored by a small group of Scottish Rite 
Masons.  However, the political weight behind the measure came 
primarily from the Ku Klux Klan.  The Klan swept into Oregon in 
1921 and, in little more than a year, became the most powerful 
political force in the state.  The School Bill was born from post-World 
War I nationalist fervor.  Immigrants, including Catholics and 
German Lutherans, were mistrusted and perceived as unpatriotic, as 
was anyone seen to be sympathetic to Bolshevism or socialism.  The 
arrests of more than 7000 suspected radicals during the Red Scare of 
1919-20 were the most dramatic indicator of the nationalism 
sweeping the country.  Mandatory public education was touted as a 
powerful tool to assimilate immigrants and indoctrinate all children in 
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American values.  The Oregon initiative process allowed a powerful 
minority faction to put before the voters a proposal born primarily of 
fear and hatred.  It gave the homogenous, Protestant majority the 
power, and the opportunity, to determine the fate of private education. 
The sponsors of the School Bill gambled that the majority could be 
persuaded to ignore the interests of the minority religious groups who 
maintained private schools.  An editorial in The Portland Telegram 
described the attitudes of many favoring the School Bill: “We, the 
majority, have decided what is necessary . . . . The public schools 
please us.  Why not make them please the other fellow?  Why not 
march him up to the school of our choice and say to him in effect: 
‘There, take that, it’s good for you.’”57 
School Bill proponents were not content to rest their campaign on 
simple appeals to majority politics.  The face of their campaign 
advocated the imperatives of assimilation and nationalism.  But they 
also waged a more nefarious campaign, using misinformation and fear 
to exploit voters’ prejudice toward minority groups. 
The contentious School Bill campaign foreshadowed the persistent 
problems that plague the initiative process and give serious concern 
about the harm posed by exploiting voter ignorance and prejudice.  As 
with many controversial initiatives that emerged in later years and 
decades, the campaign was marked by voter confusion about the 
initiative and blatant appeals to distrust of minorities.  In 1922, 
Catholics, immigrants, and political radicals were the targeted groups.  
Today, while the identities of the groups may differ, the tactic of 
demonizing unpopular minorities often mirrors the hate-filled 
campaign of 1922.58 
A.  Deception in the Ballot 
The sponsors of the School Bill called their initiative the 
“Compulsory Education Bill,” a title liable to confuse voters who 
thought they were voting to assure the continuation of mandatory 
attendance requirements.  Oregon already had compulsory education; 
compulsory attendance laws were enacted in 1889, requiring children 
between the ages of nine and fifteen to attend school. 
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Complaints that the sponsors intended to mislead voters with the 
ballot title dated from the signature-gathering phase.  The Portland 
Spectator reported that sponsors secured signatures by assuring 
citizens that the purpose of the initiative was “to give every child an 
education.”59  The pamphlet released by the Catholic Civic Rights 
Association against the School Bill argued, “[t]his bill secured a place 
on the official ballot by fraud, misrepresentation, and 
misunderstanding of many of those who signed the petitions . . . .”60  
Interviews with petition signers suggested that perhaps thousands 
signed under the belief that the measure was merely a compulsory 
school attendance proposal. 
Proponents exploited the misconception about the purpose of the 
School Bill throughout the campaign.  They urged citizens to vote 
“yes” for “Compulsory Education.”61  This misnomer gave School 
Bill advocates the strategic advantage of charging their opponents 
with harming Oregon’s children by being “anti-compulsory 
education.”  The opponents tried to alert voters to the real purpose of 
the initiative, calling it the “so-called Compulsory Education Bill.”  In 
addition to reaping the benefits of any confusion generated by the 
ballot title, School Bill supporters successfully used the ballot title as 
a campaign slogan.  The ballot title made it easy for supporters to 
distill the campaign to a simple proposition, “Are you for the public 
schools or against them?” 
Despite widespread efforts to prevent voters from being misled by 
the ballot title, School Bill opponents believed that many voters went 
to the polls and voted for what they thought was “compulsory 
education.”  In a pamphlet printed after the election entitled 
Remember Oregon, Dudley Wooten, Executive Secretary of the 
Oregon Catholic Civic Rights Association, wrote that: “[a] potent 
influence in the election, as it was cunningly contrived it should be, 
was the false and misleading title given to the bill.”62  The effect of 
this deceptive name misled thousands of voters, and created such 
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confusion in the minds of thousands of others that they refrained from 
voting at all.  Wooten acknowledged the advantage the ballot title 
may have given its sponsors: “it served to put the opponents of the 
measure in a false light before the general public, by making it appear 
that they were warring against compulsory education in the free 
public schools.”63 
B. Appeals to Prejudice 
Appeals to prejudice may be a far more potent campaign tactic than 
exploiting voter confusion.  The proponents of the School Bill 
recognized that the overwhelmingly Protestant, white voters in 
Oregon had little experience with diversity.  Catholics and immigrants 
made convenient scapegoats for the substantial problems of postwar 
America.  The risk that the Bolshevik Revolution would be 
successfully exported to America created a profound national unease, 
particularly in states where economic turmoil prevailed.  In Oregon, 
the profitable shipbuilding industry collapsed after the war, creating 
massive unemployment and labor unrest.  School Bill proponents 
played on Oregonians’ political fears and economic anxieties by 
assuring voters that compulsory public education promised an 
egalitarian process of assimilation that would bring stability to the 
country and guarantee a new generation of patriotic Americans.64 
The compulsory public schooling movement tapped into deep 
suspicions about Catholics.  Some proponents, led by the Ku Klux 
Klan (“Klan”) leaders, wanted to be certain that Oregonians perceived 
Catholics as unpatriotic and beholden to a foreign power in Rome.  
The Scottish Rite Masons’ aggressive support of compulsory public 
education contained mixed messages, combining appeals to patriotism 
and anti-elitism with blatant bigotry.  The Oregon Masons published a 
number of ads rife with anti-Catholic messages.  One typical ad 
charged that opponents of the School Bill include “[t]hose who 
believe the rights of church should take precedence over the rights of 
the state.”65  The Klan also directly provoked hostility toward 
Catholics, as in this statement by Exalted Cyclops Fred Gifford: “We 
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do feel that as the allegiance of Catholics is to a foreign power, the 
pope, that their clannish attempts to extend the temporal power of the 
pope over the offices of this country is opposed to the best interests of 
America . . . .”66 
To Klan audiences, Gifford spoke even more bluntly, throwing 
them the raw meat of bigotry he claimed they craved: “Somehow 
these mongrel hordes must be Americanized; failing that, deportation 
is the only remedy [in the] best interests of America.”67  Other Klan 
leaders aggressively attacked Catholics.  The Reverend Reuben H. 
Sawyer, Klan leader and pastor of Portland’s East Side Christian 
Church, was one notorious example.  His garbled message sounded a 
veritable potpourri of religious bigotry, nativism, and patriotism: 
 The Ku Klux Klan swears allegiance to the flag and not to the 
church. . . . 
 One of our purposes is to try to get the Bible back into the 
schools, such as it was in the old days.  The little red schoolhouse 
on the hill is the cornerstone and foundation for our government.  
Within the next few years we hope to see only native born 
Americans rule the government instead of foreigners.68 
While the anti-Catholic strategy preyed on Protestant fears that 
Catholics answered only to Rome, it also fostered antipathy toward 
Catholic schools.  Proponents urged voters to protect the public 
schools from the “Roman monopoly” and the “catechized 
monstrosities [that] would destroy all of our public schools.”69  
Masonic supporters of the initiative, proclaiming the “truth” as to the 
official position of Masonry on the public schools, boasted that all 
Masons pledge to protect the public schools from the “assults [sic] of 
those who would destroy and create in its stead a system of parochial 
schools, supported by public taxation, dominated and controlled by 
and under the absolute influence and power of an autocratic 
hierarchy, upon ideas foreign in conception and directly contrary to 
the theory of . . . American democracy.”70 
Allegations of substandard education and incompetent teaching in 
private schools surfaced, intermingled with insinuations about the 
appropriateness of the curriculum, particularly in parochial schools.  
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The disseminators of these innuendos never offered evidence to 
support their claims.  On the surface, these criticisms purportedly 
were directed at the adequacy of citizenship instruction in religious 
schools.  But the criticisms also played on Protestants’ lack of 
familiarity with Catholic schools.  Sometimes implied, sometimes 
explicit, these charges all made the same point: Catholics could not be 
trusted to teach American patriotism because they were committed to 
instructing loyalty to Rome over loyalty to country. 
The anti-Catholic campaign exploited Protestant Oregonians’ 
ignorance of the Catholic religion by portraying the Catholic Church 
as a secretive cult, beholden to suspicious and immoral practices.  Dr. 
James R. Johnson, Portland Klan leader, traveled Oregon making 
inflammatory speeches that accused Catholic priests of misusing the 
confessional to obtain sexually stimulating disclosures.  Johnson and 
other Klan members paraded a series of disgruntled ex-nuns and 
priests before audiences eager to hear scandalous tales of sexual and 
physical abuse within the Catholic cloister.  Ex-nun Elizabeth 
Schoffen, the most infamous mouthpiece for the Oregon Klan, 
denounced the church before packed auditoriums.  Schoffen served 
for many years as a floor supervisor at St. Vincent’s Hospital in 
Portland, but she left her Order and turned on the church after she was 
transferred to a less prestigious assignment.  Speaking as “Sister 
Lucretia” and drawing on her purported thirty-one years of experience 
as a nun, she spread sordid accusations about depraved behavior at St. 
Vincent’s.  At one of her more seamy speeches—one restricted to 
“men only”—a man representing more than fifty physicians attempted 
to distribute flyers protesting her attacks against St. Vincent’s.  He 
was beaten until unconscious and dumped outside of town.  The 
Sisters of St. Vincent responded with a public refutation of Sister 
Lucretia’s charges.  They also requested Portland Mayor George 
Baker launch a public inquiry to prevent further damage to the 
hospital’s reputation, an invitation that Baker refused.71  In response, 
a group of fifty-eight non-Catholic physicians paid for a full-page 
advertisement protesting the vilification of the Sisters through crude 
and malicious falsehoods.72 
These attacks on Catholics took on new relevance to many 
Oregonians upset about the explosive political issue of public school 
teachers wearing religious garb in school.  Approximately twenty 
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nuns worked in public schools throughout Oregon, both as teachers 
and principals.  These nuns wore the habits of their religious orders 
during the school day.  The Klan lost no time in circulating campaign 
ads built around pictures of public school classes posing with their 
teacher in religious garb.  The ads simply instructed voters “Find the 
Teachers—then THINK!”73  Other ads identified the nuns teaching in 
public schools and their respective salaries, and then quoted part of a 
statement by Theodore Roosevelt, who opposed “any appropriation of 
public money for sectarian purposes.”74  The juxtaposition of these 
pictures with the charge that Catholics sought to control the public 
schools provided powerful propaganda for School Bill proponents.  
One of the first acts taken by the Klan-dominated 1923 legislature 
was the enactment of a law banning public teachers from wearing 
religious garb in the classroom. 
The Oregon Klan’s pamphlet on the School Bill, The Old Cedar 
School, exemplified Klan strategy toward working class Oregonians.  
Part populism, part religious bigotry, The Old Cedar School managed 
both to excoriate multiple minority religions for their elitist efforts to 
destroy public education and to deny any religious animus.  Replete 
with longing for a more homogeneous era, the pamphlet offered a 
dialogue between an unsophisticated farmer and his troublesome 
children, who married Catholics, Episcopalians, Methodists, and 
Seventh-Day Adventists.  The children intended to reject the Old 
Cedar School, a fictitious public school, in favor of private religious 
schools.  In the Forward, King Kleagle Luther Powell wove populist 
and progressive themes, claiming that the School Bill campaign 
represents a “battle of the mass of humanity against sects, classes, 
combinations and rings; against entrenched privilege and secret 
machinations of the favored few to control the less favored many,” 
and that those who opposed the initiative “wished to work their 
children and collect their earnings.”75  According to Powell, the Klan 
supported the School Bill because the group had a duty to protect 
public schools from the onslaught of private religious education, not 
because it desired the “destruction or injury of any religious sect.”76 
 
73 Campaign flyer, Lutheran Schools Committee, Compulsory Education Bill in 
Oregon, 1922–1925, MSS 646, Oregon Historical Society Research Library. 
74 ASTORIA BUDGET, Oct. 2, 1922. 
75 GEORGE ESTES, THE OLD CEDAR SCHOOL 5 (1922). 
76 Id. at 6. 
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The Old Cedar School ridiculed its opponents, mocking a fictional 
intellectual windbag named the Hon. Ab. Squealright, and Catholic 
education at the “Academy of St. Gregory’s Holy Toe Nail,” where 
children learn “Histomorphology, the Petrine Supremacy, 
Transubstantion . . . [and] the Beatification of Saint Caviar.”77  Nor 
did it equivocate on charging minority religions with a conspiracy to 
destroy the public schools.  A full-page cartoon at the end of the 
pamphlet depicts the Old Cedar School, with its loyal, old teacher in 
the doorway welcoming children of all backgrounds and religions 
while the American flag waves atop the bell tower.  But holding the 
children back are the Catholic, Episcopalian, Methodist, and Seventh-
Day Adventist mothers.  As a Catholic priest approaches the school 
with a burning torch, an Episcopalian bishop, a Seventh-Day 
Adventist minister, and a Methodist superintendent swing against the 
foundation of the school with large mallets.  The last image, also a 
full page, shows the school in flames, toppling from its foundation 
with the old schoolteacher dead in the doorway, his hand futilely 
grasping the cord of the burning school bell as the American flag, 
severed from the school tower, ignites.  The Catholic priest walks 
away, his torch extinguished, a smile on his face.78 
In the pamphlet, as elsewhere in the Klan campaign, the Klan 
hurled accusations of religious persecution back at their opponents, 
charging them with manufacturing claims about religious bigotry to 
protect their elitist institutions.79  Klan leaders ridiculed all non-
Protestant religions, mocking “Mohammedans,” polygamists, and 
“head-hunters,” who “howled” religious persecution whenever the 
enlightened majority intervened to halt their brutal practices.80 
As the campaign progressed, the anti-Catholic assault became more 
public and personal.  The Klan attempted to undermine its opponents 
by accusing Protestant adversaries of being Catholic, or part of the 
Catholic “machine.”  The most prominent victim of this 
misinformation campaign was Governor Ben Olcott.  Governor Olcott 
faced rumors that were spread throughout the state that he and his 
wife were Catholic and sent their children to Catholic school, and that 
his deceased sister, a Methodist Sunday school teacher before her 
death, was still alive and living as a nun in San Francisco.  False 
 
77 Id. at 26. 
78 Id. at 38, 44. 
79 Id. at 7–8. 
80 Id. 
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statistics about the number of Catholics appointed to government 
positions by Olcott circulated as evidence of Olcott’s obeisance to the 
Catholic machine. 
Many of the newspapers in the state failed to challenge the 
campaign of prejudice waged throughout the state.  Some supported 
the Klan; others feared its wrath.  Newspaper editors opposed to the 
Klan or the School Bill fell prey to deceitful charges.  The Klan 
regularly assailed adverse editorials as the work of Catholics.  In an 
editorial entitled “Liars and Us,” The Bend Bulletin alleged that 
“[e]ver since we began our argument against the Ku Klux Klan . . . 
reports have been coming to us of a story going about to the effect 
that the editor . . . was a Catholic” and that the Bulletin “‘is controlled 
by the Catholics,’ and people have been asked to boycott us on that 
account.”81  Hugh Hume, the editor of the weekly, The Spectator, 
faced similar false accusations.82  The public status of the recipients 
of these attacks put them in the awkward position of denying the 
allegations while at the same time trying to assure voters that they 
would be proud to be Catholic and were only protesting the 
“unconscionable” lying of their attackers. 
Misinformation was also spread about the propensity of parochial 
school graduates to engage in criminal behavior.  Distortions of 
Catholic scripture also surfaced.  Anti-Catholic speakers ranted that 
“the law of the Church says drink all you can,” a dramatic 
misinterpretation of Christ’s counsel to his disciples at the Last 
Supper to “drink ye all of this.”83 
C.  The Catholic Response 
As in any political campaign grounded in bigotry, School Bill 
opponents faced significant political risks if they aggressively 
denounced the religious bigotry in the School Bill campaign.  
Moderate voters perhaps could be persuaded that the School Bill 
threatened religious liberty.  These arguments could easily backfire if 
voters perceived them as charges of religious prejudice.  School Bill 
opponents often found themselves on the defensive when they 
attempted to debate the impact of the measure on religious liberty.  
 
81 Editorial, Liars and Us, BEND BULLETIN, Oct. 20, 1922, at 4. 
82 SAALFELD, supra note 56, at 53. 
83 Stenographic record of lecture in Lebanon, Oregon, Catholic Truth Society Archives, 
as quoted in The Case of the Sisters of the Holy Names vs. The State of Oregon, Sisters of 
the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary Research Library. 
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Catholics, acutely sensitive to the potential backlash, devised a 
strategy that championed the importance of religious liberty and 
tolerance to all Americans and downplayed religiously divisive 
attacks.  It was a weak and generic response to the bigotry inflamed 
by the Klan.  Opponents of the initiative staked their campaign on 
convincing voters that compulsory public education violated the 
rights of parents to control the education of their children, an 
argument that ultimately persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
failed to sway Oregonians.  When the votes were counted, the School 
Bill passed by a margin of 11,821 votes, 115,506 to 103,685, 
garnering 52.7% of the vote.84  Interestingly, 22,066 voters showed 
up at the polls but abstained from voting on the School Bill; thus the 
abstainers were almost double the margin of victory.85  Whether those 
voters abstained from confusion or apathy is a matter of conjecture, as 
is the intent of the voters who approved the measure.  Some voters 
certainly voted for the School Bill because they decided that 
compulsory public schooling offered an anti-elitist, egalitarian 
education in democracy.  But others just as certainly channeled their 
prejudices and fears into a “Yes” vote. 
The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
the largest provider of private education in the state, joined with the 
secular Hill Military Academy to challenge the law in federal court.  
In 1924, the federal district court in Oregon found the School Bill 
unconstitutional, concluding that it violated the economic rights of 
schools, teachers, and parents.86  By the time the U.S. Supreme Court 
rendered its decision in 1925, the political influence of the Klan in 
Oregon had dissipated.  The Court’s holding that the School Bill 
violated the constitutional rights of parents to control the upbringing 
and education of their children relieved most Oregonians, many of 
whom were uncomfortable with the scorn directed at Oregon for its 
passage of an initiative perceived nationally as the product of bigotry. 
 
84 OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM 
AND RECALL: 1922–1928, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ 
elections14.htm (last visited June 3, 2009). 
85 OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, BLUE BOOK AND OFFICIAL DIRECTORY, 1923–
1924, at 170 (1923). 
86 Soc’y of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928 (D. Or. 1924). 
 2008] The Majority Will 1051 
IV 
VOTER CONFUSION AND BIAS IN THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 
The voter confusion and appeals to prejudice that marked the 
initiative campaign for compulsory public education are not unique to 
that controversy.  To the contrary, they are emblematic of persistent 
concerns with the use of the initiative to determine social policy.  
Initiative states tend to use direct democracy to enact conservative 
social legislation, including the death penalty, restrictive abortion 
laws, and anti-gay rights measures.87  Voter ignorance or confusion 
about ballot measures often leads voters to abstain from voting on 
those ballot items.88  One analysis of the first thirty years of the 
Oregon initiative showed, on average, a twenty-seven percent voter 
“drop off”—voters who show up at the polls but fail to vote on one or 
more ballot measures.89 
The reasons for the low voter response to direct legislation during 
that period are not documented.  Voter confusion may explain some 
voter behavior, as well as apathy.  More recent data offers insight on 
voters who pull the lever for candidates but not ballot measures.  
Surveys show a wide range of voters express concerns that ballot 
measures are too complicated to understand.90  In Oregon, twenty 
 
87 See John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 195 
(2005). 
88 A 1985 survey of California voters found sixty-eight percent said they would not vote 
on a ballot measure if they were not knowledgeable on the issue.  Eule, supra note 4, at 
1518 n.54.  In a 2005 voter survey in California, when asked to name the ballot measure 
that interested them the most, voters’ top response was “don’t know” (thirty-eight percent) 
or “none” (twelve percent).  Press Release, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Special Survey on 
Californians and the Initiative Process (Sept. 2005), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/ 
survey/S_905MBS.pdf.  Of voters polled in the 2005 survey, seventy-seven percent found 
ballot initiatives “complicated and confusing.”  Id. at vi.  On voter confusion, see also 
Rose, supra note 31; Magleby, supra note 4, at 23; PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY, 
IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 121–22 (1992). 
89 Waldo Schumacher, Thirty Years of the People’s Rule in Oregon: An Analysis, 47 
POL. SCI. Q. 242, 245 (1932). 
90 Eule, supra note 4, at 1516 n.46 and accompanying text (“A recent poll of voters 
revealed that only fifteen percent of those surveyed felt that they consistently knew enough 
about initiative measures to make a wise decision.  Another 37% claimed to know enough 
about the issues involved to make a wise decision on ballot measures ‘most’ of the time.  
The remaining 47% admitted to confusion on a regular basis.  Similar voter perceptions 
were detected in an earlier mail survey of four western states.  Thus, 41% of Arizona 
voters surveyed ‘strongly agreed’ that initiative and referendum measures on the ballot 
were ‘so complicated that one can't understand what is going on’ with 33% agreeing 
‘somewhat.’  In Colorado, 23% strongly agreed and 36% agreed somewhat.  In Oregon, 
the figures were 20% and 40% and in Washington, 18% and 34%.” (citation omitted)). 
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percent of voters “strongly agreed” that ballot measures were too 
complicated to understand; forty percent of voters agreed 
“somewhat.”91  Oregon, like a number of other direct legislation 
states, limits an initiative to “one subject only.”92  Oregon also 
requires that any “two or more amendments” be “separately” 
submitted on the ballot.93  These provisions offer some protection 
against voter confusion by prohibiting logrolling of proposals but they 
do little to address voter confusion occurring from complex or poorly 
worded ballot titles or text. 
Voter confusion presents particular concerns when the rights of 
minorities are on the ballot.  Confused voters frequently vote counter 
to the policies they intend to support.94  The risk that substantive 
policy will be made based on an inaccurate reflection of voter will is 
especially problematic when individual rights are at stake.  The 
School Bill campaign demonstrated that voter confusion can be a 
powerful partner to prejudice, leading to the enactment of laws 
harmful to minority interests.  The School Bill campaign also 
revealed that fomenting voter confusion is often a tactical component 
of a campaign strategy that seeks to obscure the issues. 
Voter confusion is not a problem specific to direct democracy.  
Voter ignorance and confusion exist on matters of candidate choice, 
not just ballot measures.  But a misinformed vote for or against a 
candidate typically poses less risk of harm than voter error in the 
enactment of substantive policy.  The deliberative process embodied 
in representative government is designed, through checks and 
balances, to prevent abuse by an individual—both in the accumulation 
of power and in the perpetuation of hostile legislation.  These 
 
91 Id. 
92 See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(d); see also CAL. CONST. art. II, § 18; OHIO CONST. 
art. II, § 15(d); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 57; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
93 OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. 
94 See Eule, supra note 4, at 1518 (“Studies of voting on propositions generally reveal a 
significant percentage of voters casting ballots at variance with their stated policy 
preferences.  Estimates of this number generally run from ten to fifteen percent, although 
occasionally the figures rise much higher. . . . In a 1980 plebiscite on a local rent control 
ordinance those desiring to retain rent control were required to vote against the measure.  
Over three-fourths of the voters questioned in exit surveys did not match up their views on 
rent control with their votes on the measure.  One quarter favoring rent control incorrectly 
voted yes while one half opposing it erroneously cast a negative vote.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT 
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984) (fifteen percent of voters on a 1979 Ohio 
referendum voted at variance with their stated position; sixty percent who voted on 1969 
California lottery proposition marked ballot capriciously). 
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protections limit the potential for mischief from any one elected 
official. 
Voter abstention on initiatives is particularly problematic.  Where 
abstention is high, lawmaking by initiative, unlike legislation, may 
result in the enactment of substantial social change based on the will 
of less than a majority of voters.  During the first thirty years of direct 
legislation in Oregon, more than sixty-eight percent of the ballot 
measures were either adopted or rejected by a minority of registered 
voters.95  The 11,000-plus margin of voter approval on the School 
Bill was half of the 22,000 voters who went to the polls but abstained 
from casting their opinion on compulsory public education.96  These 
statistics highlight the risks of interest group capture—that a highly 
motivated faction will use the initiative process to make social policy 
with the support of less than a majority of the electorate.  Voter 
confusion and abstention tend to favor interest group capture by 
reducing ballot measure voters to special interest voters.  The threat of 
interest group capture is particularly problematic when the rights of 
minority political groups are put to a vote.  Special interest groups 
fronting initiatives often are ideologically driven factions, mobilized 
after failing to convince the legislature to act on their proposals. 
The vulnerability of minority groups to discrimination through 
direct legislation is a direct consequence of majoritarian governance.  
The majority often has little incentive to protect minority interests and 
every incentive to further its own interests.  A recent analysis of direct 
legislation addressing gay rights, English language laws, AIDS 
policy, school desegregation, and housing and public 
accommodations for racial minorities found “strong evidence” that 
minority groups suffer from direct legislation.97  Of the seventy-four 
civil rights initiatives examined, more than ninety-two percent 
“actively sought” to limit minority rights.98  An extension of this 
analysis concluded that, faithful to Madison’s concern, minority rights 
are most vulnerable in smaller, homogeneous political communities.99 
The School Bill was the first successful Oregon initiative targeting 
an unpopular minority, but it has hardly been the last.  Although the 
 
95 Schumacher, supra note 89, at 249. 
96 Id. at 252. 
97 Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 
245–46 (1997). 
98 Id. at 254. 
99 Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An 
Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1023 (1998). 
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use of direct legislation in Oregon subsided for a number of decades, 
the late 1970s saw a resurgence in measures impacting minority 
groups, including reinstatement of the death penalty, mandatory 
minimum sentence requirements, and crime victims’ protection.100  
The most blatant recent targeting of a minority group through direct 
legislation has been a series of initiative proposals limiting rights of 
homosexuals.101  Although voters have not approved all of these 
measures, the overt targeting of gay and lesbians reinforces concerns 
about the use of direct legislation as a tool of discrimination.  This 
criticism does not suggest that legislatures are immune from 
approving discriminatory legislation.  One need look no further than 
the Jim Crow laws for evidence that representative government also 
can fail to protect unpopular minorities.  But more typically, 
representative government and the deliberative process function 
effectively to reject discriminatory proposals.  In representative 
government, judicial review serves as the last level of scrutiny in a 
system designed to constrain the excesses of the majority.  By 
contrast, judicial review provides the only substantive check on the 
enactment of discriminatory laws through direct legislation. 
V 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
Although there is a persuasive argument that direct legislation is a 
departure from representative government, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has shown little inclination to revisit its 1912 holding that the issue is 
nonjusticiable.102  The Court should reconsider its decision in Pacific 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co.  The opinion relied upon an 1849 
decision, Luther v. Borden, in which the Court refused to decide 
which of two dueling government factions should be deemed the 
lawful government of Rhode Island, concluding that the issue 
presented a nonjusticiable political question under the Guarantee 
Clause.103  The Court in Pacific States should not have equated the 
 
100 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.005–163.145 (amended 1978 and 1984); id. ch. 136 and § 
40.385 (amended 1986), ch. 137 (amended 1988). 
101 See, e.g., Minority Status and Child Protection Act, Oregon Ballot Measure 13 
(1994) (denying minority status to homosexuals). 
102 A number of commentators have urged the Supreme Court to reexamine its 1912 
holding in Pacific States.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 304; Marci A. 
Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 
13–14 (1997). 
103 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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dispute in Luther with the challenge to the Oregon initiative process.  
The challenge to lawmaking by initiative presented a different, and 
far narrower question; it attacked the form, not the existence of 
republican government.  Unlike Luther, where the Court was asked to 
identify the legitimate government of the state, Pacific States 
involved a challenge to the method of lawmaking in an established 
government.  Luther represents the paradigmatic “political” question.  
The Court in Baker v. Carr agreed, noting that Luther’s only 
significance is its holding that “the Guaranty Clause is not a 
repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could 
utilize independently in order to identify a State’s lawful 
government.”104  In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, opened the door to some reconsideration of 
the Guarantee Clause: “More recently, the Court has suggested that 
perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present 
nonjusticiable political questions.”105  Even if the Court is willing to 
revisit the broader question of the justiciability of the Guarantee 
Clause, it has given no indication that it would be inclined to entertain 
a challenge to the constitutionality of direct legislation.  To the extent 
that judicial review remains the only meaningful check on direct 
democracy, courts should carefully scrutinize laws and amendments 
enacted by direct legislation that undermine one of the core values 
underlying representative democracy—the protection of minorities 
from majority tyranny. 
A.  State Judicial Review 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Armatta v. 
Kitzhaber shows an increased willingness by the court to scrutinize 
direct legislation.106  In Armatta, the court struck down Ballot 
Measure 40, a crime victims’ rights initiative, because the measure 
violated an Oregon constitutional  requirement that any “two or more 
amendments” to the Oregon Constitution must be voted upon 
separately.107  Armatta marks the first time the court substantively 
addressed the separate vote requirement.  Since then, the court has 
struck down a number of other initiatives under the Armatta rule; 
these opinions represent the most successful attacks on the initiative 
 
104 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962). 
105 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992). 
106 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998). 
107 OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. 
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in Oregon history.108  Although the Armatta test does not assess the 
substantive legitimacy of ballot measures, it nonetheless offers a 
potent judicial check on direct legislation, particularly of measures 
that may be the product of voter confusion from multiple subjects. 
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde has argued 
persuasively that state courts should scrutinize direct legislation under 
the Guarantee Clause.109  State courts have tended to read Pacific 
States as a broad preclusion of judicial review under the Guarantee 
Clause.110  If, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court suggests in New 
York, Pacific States does not preclude judicial review of all issues 
under the Guarantee Clause, state courts should begin to ascertain 
whether, and under what circumstances, the initiative may undermine 
a republican form of government.111  The 1903 Kadderly decision, 
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Pacific States, does not bar 
further consideration of whether aspects of direct legislation may 
violate the Guarantee Clause.  Kadderly simply held that direct 
legislation is not inherently inconsistent with a republican form of 
government; it does not stand for the conclusion that all uses of direct 
legislation are consistent with the Guarantee Clause.112  State courts 
should begin to address what challenges to direct legislation may be 
subject to judicial review under the Guarantee Clause. 
B. Federal Judicial Review 
Federal judicial review offers an important check on state laws and 
constitutional amendments enacted through direct legislation.  The 
late professor Julian Eule, in a thorough analysis of direct legislation, 
advocated a “hard look” by courts faced with constitutional 
challenges to lawmaking by plebiscite.113  Eule argued that the 
normal presumption of constitutionality that attaches to judicial 
review of most legislation should not apply when a court is reviewing 
direct legislation.  In the absence of the filters so essential to 
representative democracy, it falls to the courts to assure that the 
 
108 Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 231, 37 P.3d 989 (2002); Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 
597, 43 P.3d 1094 (2002); League of Or. Cities v. State, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002). 
109 See, e.g., Linde, supra note 30; Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican 
Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994). 
110 See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996). 
111 See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973). 
112 Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 145, 74 P. 710, 720 (1903). 
113 Eule, supra note 4, at 1558. 
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values of representative government have not been disrupted by direct 
legislation.114  While I agree with Eule’s assessment, my proposal is 
narrower, focusing on the risk of harm to minority groups presented 
by direct legislation: the courts should dispense with any presumption 
of constitutionality when reviewing direct legislation that harms a 
historically disadvantaged minority group.  Close scrutiny of direct 
legislation compensates for the absence of the deliberative process 
and provides a necessary check on animus-based initiatives.  Close 
scrutiny should occur even where the law is facially neutral and even 
if the disadvantaged group is not otherwise entitled to heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  I offer this proposal for 
several reasons.  First, discrimination against minorities is the most 
significant harm posed by the initiative process.  Further, the focus on 
harm to minority groups is consistent with the Framers’ concerns 
about direct democracy.  Finally, existing equal protection doctrine 
easily could accommodate enhanced scrutiny of direct legislation that 
harms unpopular minorities. 
Current equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires the courts to impose strict scrutiny on classifications based 
on suspect criteria such as race, national origin, or religion.115  
Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy are considered quasi-
suspect and receive intermediate scrutiny.116  Heightened scrutiny 
generally protects suspect and quasi-suspect classes from 
discriminatory lawmaking where the classification is obvious on the 
face of the legislation.117  Facially neutral classifications that are 
alleged to disadvantage suspect or quasi-suspect groups are subject to 
heightened scrutiny only if the classification has a disparate impact on 
the minority group and evidence of discriminatory purpose is 
established.118  Classifications not based on suspect or quasi-suspect 
criteria are presumed constitutional unless they fail to satisfy a 
rationality test.119  The presumption of constitutionality typically 
insulates legislation impacting nonsuspect classes or classifications 
that are not apparent on the face of the law. 
 
114 Id. at 1558–59. 
115 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
116 Under intermediate scrutiny, the classification must be substantially related to an 
important government interest.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
117 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
118 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
119 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981). 
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The presumption of constitutionality is based, in part, on the 
assurance of checks and balances in lawmaking undertaken through 
the deliberative process.  The famous Carolene Products footnote 
describes certain types of legislation where the presumption of 
constitutionality should not apply, including “legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,” and situations where 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.”120  Although the footnote addresses only legislation, the 
principles, resting upon a concern for situations where the political 
process may malfunction to negate normal checks and balances, are 
equally applicable to lawmaking by plebiscite.  Direct legislation 
targeting  minorities should be subject to heightened scrutiny 
precisely because it circumvents the checks and balances designed to 
protect minority interests. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans offers 
support for careful scrutiny when reviewing direct legislation 
disadvantaging minority groups.  In Romer, the Court invalidated a 
Colorado constitutional amendment enacted by referendum that 
repealed state and local laws protecting gays and lesbians from 
discrimination and prohibited the enactment of new laws protecting 
gays and lesbians.121  Classifications based on sexual orientation 
typically receive rational basis review.122  Although the Court did not 
indicate any special standard would apply to review of direct 
legislation, it did examine the legislation with a scrutiny 
uncharacteristic of rational basis review.  The Court struck down the 
referendum because it concluded that it was the product of animus.123  
As the Court explained, legislation motivated by animus is per se a 
violation of equal protection: “[I]f the constitutional conception of 
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
 
120 Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (emphasis added). 
121 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
122 The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the standard of review for 
classifications based on sexual orientation.  Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals to rule on 
the issue have held that rational basis is the appropriate standard of review.  See, e.g., 
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
123 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. 
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cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”124  The Court 
has invalidated other direct legislation when it found that the purpose 
of the law was to disadvantage minority groups.125  The Court’s 
analyses in these cases reflect a certain suspicion, not only about the 
purpose behind these measures, but also more generally about the 
ability of the direct legislation process to correct for discrimination.  
Unfortunately Romer obscures the issue by purporting to apply 
traditional rational basis review; the Court should articulate a standard 
of heightened review of direct legislation to ensure that animus will 
not go undetected. 
Equal protection doctrine is heavily dependent upon purpose-based 
inquiry.  The text and impact of direct legislation is as easily analyzed 
as lawmaking by representative bodies.  While direct legislation does 
not provide the traditional legislative record to evaluate purpose, it 
offers ballot measure statements and campaign materials that serve a 
similar function.  As with analysis of legislative lawmaking, the issue 
is not the individual motivations of the sponsors and voters, but rather 
the purpose of the law.  Deceptive ballot titles and voter information, 
with resulting voter confusion, may be highly relevant to evidence of 
discriminatory purpose. 
The most tenable way for the U.S. Supreme Court to proceed in 
reviewing direct legislation is to find challenges to direct legislation 
justiciable under the Guarantee Clause and address whether direct 
legislation undermines the core principles of representative 
democracy.  Even without reconsideration of the Guarantee Clause, 
the Court should reject the presumption of constitutionality attached 
to facially neutral legislation or legislation targeting nonsuspect 
classes when reviewing direct legislation disadvantaging minority 
groups.  Heightened scrutiny is justified as a check on a form of 
lawmaking that bypasses the carefully wrought constitutional 
framework of legislative and executive decision making. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has embarked on a late, but welcomed, 
scrutiny of direct legislation.  The Oregon Constitution’s separate 
vote and single subject limitations provide the potential for a 
meaningful check on the risk of majoritarian abuses of the minority.  
 
124 Id. (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
125 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking 
down a facially neutral law prohibiting mandatory busing for desegregation of the 
schools); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (limiting the authority of government to 
adopt fair housing laws). 
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Judicial review, with teeth, at both state and federal levels, offers the 
best protection of the principles of representative democracy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Oregon System of direct legislation gained national 
recognition as the prototype for popular governance.  The use of the 
initiative to pass the School Bill gained Oregon a different kind of 
notoriety: the School Bill campaign was widely condemned for 
exploiting voter confusion and prejudice to achieve passage of a 
measure that discriminated against unpopular minorities.  The 
troubling legacy of this campaign remains a force in Oregon and other 
states that employ direct legislation to limit individual rights.  As we 
contemplate both the past and the future of the Oregon Constitution, it 
is appropriate to reconsider deferential judicial review of direct 
legislation.  Direct legislation, a departure from a representative form 
of government, should be subject to rigorous scrutiny by state and 
federal courts to assure that this variance does not undermine the core 
values of representative democracy. 
 
